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Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning 
and Cultural Difference: Assessing 
the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony 
Benjamin L. Berger* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional rights, and the tests that the judiciary creates for ap-
plying and interpreting those rights, are conventionally viewed as tools 
available for responding to social disputes that have been shifted into the 
register of constitutional litigation. Yet constitutional rights and doctrines 
of constitutional interpretation do not merely respond to social and legal 
disputes, nor do these disputes appear before the bar of the law in a pure 
form, uninflected by the law and legal categories. The content, informing 
assumptions, and internal logic of constitutional rights and adjudication 
have what we might call certain “back stream effects” on the structure, 
and approach to the resolution, of social disputes. These back stream ef-
fects take at least two forms. First, constitutional design, the content of 
rights and the choices made about the constitutional logic appropriate to 
analysis of these issues impact upon and give adjudicative shape to the 
disputes themselves. Second, choices made as to how to approach the 
analysis of constitutional rights claims impose different sets of adjudica-
tive demands — perhaps, indeed, ethical demands — on those called 
upon to resolve these issues; that is, different approaches to analyzing 
rights claims and constitutional disputes call for different sets of ques-
tions to be asked and different virtues of judgment to be exercised. 
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 sits at 
the heart of our constitutional lives. It would be a reasonable generaliza-
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 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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tion to state that — with the exception of matters analyzed under sections 
7 and 15(1) — contemporary jurisprudence has shifted most constitu-
tional disputes to debate and resolution under section 1. Section 1 has 
become the hungriest, the greediest, of Charter provisions, absorbing 
most issues of genuine constitutional dispute into its analytic grasp. From 
a comparative constitutional perspective, this trend is unsurprising. Sec-
tion 1, along with the Oakes2 test that has guided the judicial approach to 
its application, is but the Canadian iteration of the logic of proportional-
ity that many have claimed lies at the heart of modern constitutionalism.3 
One theorist, sufficiently enamoured of the logic of proportionality and 
convinced of its centrality to modern constitutionalism, has labelled pro-
portionality review the “ultimate rule of law”.4 However ambitious the 
scope of one’s claim, it seems to be beyond reasonable dispute that the 
understanding of how to analyze what limits on constitutional rights can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society is the chief 
logical influence on our approach to Charter protections and adjudica-
tion. 
In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,5 the majority of 
the Supreme Court of Canada offered one of its most significant glosses 
on the approach to the section 1 analysis since it laid out the general ana-
lytic framework in Oakes. This change in the law will affect litigation of 
all constitutional rights. It will impact upon how the Courts go about 
striking the balance between governmental objectives and individual and 
collective rights. Yet these changes to the Court’s posture towards section 
1 of the Charter arose in the context of a freedom of religion case and, 
apart from identifying this shift in approach to the Oakes test, this paper 
seeks to trace the back stream effects of this change in logic on the shape 
and adjudication of freedom of religion claims. I will identify an irony at 
the core of the judgment, one that inheres in the relationship between the 
majority’s understanding of the particular challenges of freedom of relig-
ion as a constitutional right and the approach that it prescribes for the 
analysis of section 1. This approach, I will argue, has the potential to 
emphasize precisely that which the majority finds so difficult about the 
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 See, e.g., Aharon Barak, “Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 
369; Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); 
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 [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”].  
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constitutional protection of religious belief and action. With this in view, 
I will go on to note the different demands that this shift will place on ad-
judicators if this gloss on the Oakes analysis is to be more than a 
realignment of section 1 to be more deferential to government objectives. 
It is here that it will be illuminating to look across to the Court’s other 
significant freedom of religion case in 2009, C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Direc-
tor of Child and Family Services),6 and in particular, the dissenting 
judgment of Binnie J.  
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION — THE MOST DIFFICULT RIGHT? 
In an article published in 2001, Chief Justice McLachlin described 
equality as “the most difficult right”.7 Surveying the struggles and shifts 
in the Court’s jurisprudence on section 15(1) (and, more recently, section 
15(2))8 lends obvious support to this claim. Yet regard to the recent juris-
prudence of the Court on section 2(a) and, in particular, to certain 
elements of the Chief Justice’s majority judgment in Hutterian Brethren 
suggests that freedom of religion is now in contention for the dubious 
honour of this title.  
The great difficulty of the constitutional protection of religion is em-
phatically not found in navigating the internal requirements of section 
2(a). In Hutterian Brethren, the majority restated the basic test for a 
breach of section 2(a) as established in Amselem9 and Multani:10 
An infringement of s. 2(a) of the Charter will be made out where: (1) 
the claimant sincerely believes in a belief or practice that has a nexus 
with religion; and (2) the impugned measure interferes with the 
claimant’s ability to act in accordance with his or her religious belief in 
a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial. …11 
As I have written elsewhere, this test has made the section 2(a) protec-
tion so capacious as to be largely analytically vacant.12 Although there 
                                                                                                             
6
 [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (A.)”]. 
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 Beverley McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17. 
8
 R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.). 
9
 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Amselem”]. 
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 Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 
S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
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 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 5, at para. 32. 
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 Benjamin L. Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21(2) Can. J. L. & 
Jur. 245, at 257. For interesting discussions of Amselem, see Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment 
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are certain notes sounded in the Hutterian Brethren case suggesting that 
courts should give somewhat more substance to the “trivial or substantial 
interference” with religion component of the test,13 it seems that most 
cases in which a claimant is making a good faith argument that his or her 
religious beliefs or practices have been interfered with will pass easily 
into the section 1 phase of the Charter analysis. 
Freedom of religion is not, then, a difficult right owing to its doc-
trinal complexity. As one examines the case law and certain statements 
made in McLachlin C.J.C.’s majority reasons in Hutterian Brethren, it 
becomes clear that it is not the legal right itself that is difficult; rather, it 
is the very fact of according religious beliefs distinct constitutional pro-
tection that generates the challenges to which the Court is so alive in this 
case. Although the Court does not articulate it in precisely this fashion, 
what is difficult about freedom of religion is that it purports to protect 
multiple and diverse cultures, understood as broad-ranging systems of 
beliefs and practices whose significance flows from a complex set of 
symbols, histories, narratives and commitments that lend a distinctive 
meaning to the world for those who participate in them. What is difficult 
about freedom of religion is the sheer scope of possible conflict between 
religion and government objectives combined with the enormous chal-
lenge of adjudicating the internal meaning and significance of a given 
religious practice or belief not shared by the secular state. Chief Justice 
McLachlin makes a number of claims about the unique challenges of 
freedom of religion that support this understanding of what, precisely, is 
so challenging about religious freedom. Noting that the difficulty com-
mon to all constitutional rights is that the choices made by government 
about how to pursue important public objectives may trench on these 
rights or freedoms, McLachlin C.J.C. explains that “[f]reedom of religion 
presents a particular challenge in this respect because of the broad scope 
of the Charter guarantee.”14 When it comes to religion, “[m]uch of the 
regulation of a modern state could be claimed by various individuals to 
have a more than trivial impact on a sincerely held religious belief” and 
“[g]iving effect to each of their religious claims could seriously under-
mine the universality of many regulatory programs.”15 
It follows in McLachlin C.J.C.’s reasoning that 
                                                                                                             
and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 201 and Bruce Ryder, “State 
Neutrality and Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 169. 
13
 See, e.g., Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 5, at para. 34. 
14
 Id., at para. 36 (emphasis added). 
15
 Id., at para. 36. 
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[b]ecause religion touches so many facets of daily life, and because a 
host of different religions with different rites and practices co-exist in 
our society, it is inevitable that some religious practices will come into 
conflict with laws and regulatory systems of general application.16  
True though this claim is, such considerations simply establish the vast 
scope of possible conflict between various religious beliefs and practices 
and state authority; the ultimate difficulty of freedom of religion only 
comes into sharp focus when one adds to this question of scope a second 
element. This second element is the foreignness and consequent inscru-
tability (or density) of the meaning, and consequential significance, of a 
given religious belief or practice. Chief Justice McLachlin puts it 
squarely: “There is no magic barometer to measure the seriousness of a 
particular limit on a religious practice. Religion is a matter of faith, in-
termingled with culture.”17 The Chief Justice maps some of the cross-
cultural hurdles that face a judge who wishes to appreciate the signifi-
cance of a given breach of section 2(a): 
Some aspects of a religion, like prayers and the basic sacraments, may 
be so sacred that any significant limit verges on forced apostasy. Other 
practices may be optional or a matter of personal choice. Between these 
two extremes lies a vast array of beliefs and practices, more important 
to some adherent than others.18 
In her majority reasons, McLachlin C.J.C. adds one further element 
to the picture of the distinctive difficulty of religious freedom claims, an 
element that draws the first two together. She notes that when the signifi-
cance of a religious practice is at the high end of the spectrum for the 
individual or community, there may be precious little room to be found 
for a middle ground or for some form of “accommodation”. Herein lies 
yet another distinctive difficulty with section 2(a) claims:  
Freedom of religion cases may often present this “all or nothing” 
dilemma. Compromising religious beliefs is something adherents may 
understandably be unwilling to do. And governments may find it 
difficult to tailor laws to the myriad ways in which they may trench on 
different people’s religious beliefs and practices.19  
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 Id., at para. 61. 
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On this view, it is the intrinsic nature of religion combined with the 
simple fact of affording constitutional protection to religion that makes 
religious freedom and equality claims so intensely challenging. There are 
scholars who, seized with a sense of the challenges and possible hypocri-
sies of seeking to afford specific constitutional protection to religion, 
have argued that the constitutional protection of religious freedom is im-
possible,20 or that religion ought not to be given special constitutional 
status, preferring to subsume freedom of religion into more generalized 
principles of equality and liberty, disavowing any peculiar relevance to 
the religious component of freedom of religion.21 Others have claimed 
that one cannot make sense of freedom of religion without acknowledg-
ing precisely the unique nature, however challenging, of religion itself.22 
The Supreme Court of Canada does not weigh in on one side or the other 
of this debate. The inescapable fact is we have express protection of reli-
gious freedom in our Constitution. But what Hutterian Brethren offers us 
is a sharp sense of what the majority of the Court sees as so intensely 
challenging about claims of religious freedom: owing to the constitu-
tional protection of religion, the courts are faced with a vast scope of 
possible claims, the true significance of which for a community or indi-
vidual involved typically lies outside the ken of the courts, and about 
which a stark choice must sometimes be made.  
III. THE SHIFT IN ANALYZING SECTION 1 
The Court’s ruling in Hutterian Brethren was inevitable. It is not that 
the result on the merits was assured. Indeed, the result seems far from 
inevitable. Many, myself included, struggle to see the justifiability of this 
breach of section 2(a) given the size of the affected community, appar-
ently available alternatives, the genuineness of the belief involved, its 
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 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 
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centrality to the lived religion of the community, and the in-built under-
inclusiveness of the legislation.23  
For those attentive to the developing law on section 2(a) of the Char-
ter, what was inevitable was a change, gloss or reinterpretation of section 
1 as it applied in religious freedom cases. In my view, despite the gap in 
time between the two cases, the Hutterian Brethren decision is most use-
fully read as the companion case to Amselem. In Amselem, the Court’s 
broad definition of religion and enunciation of the capacious test internal 
to section 2(a) was designed to get judges out of the business of assess-
ing the internal dictates of religions and the bona fides of claimed 
religious commitments and practices. This is not to say that Amselem 
meant that courts would have no screening role to play in section 2(a). A 
common misreading of Amselem is that the Court held that judges must 
defer to the subjective assertions of applicants claiming a breach of their 
section 2(a) right. Judges retain a role in assessing the sincerity of the 
claim. Evidence of community practice, religious precept and historical 
observance remains relevant to that assessment. It is nevertheless true, 
however, that the ultimate test would be a subjective one, meaning that 
much would sail easily through section 2(a) into the rapacious arms of 
section 1. The opening up of the definition of religiously protected belief 
and practice in section 2(a) meant a shifting of the analytic burden in re-
ligion cases to section 1. Legal systems are like softly inflated balloons: 
if you squeeze on one side, you can expect a bulge elsewhere. The deci-
sion in Hutterian Brethren would prove to be the bulge in section 1. 
The Court had flirted with the idea of injecting the concept of rea-
sonable accommodation into the Oakes analysis in Multani;24 however, 
in Hutterian Brethren, the Court rejected this approach.25 Instead, 
McLachlin C.J.C. ushered in a new orientation to the proportionality 
component of the Oakes test. This modified or revised approach boils 
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 I refer here to the fact that the photographic requirement applied only to those with 
driver’s licences, leaving hundreds of thousands of Albertans outside the face-recognition database 
at the centre of the government’s scheme.  
24
 Supra, note 10, at paras. 52-53. On the relationship between reasonable accommodation 
and minimal impairment in the context of religious freedoms, see José Woehrling, “L’obligation 
d’accommodement raisonnable et l’adaptation de la société à la diversité religieuse” (1998) 43 
McGill L.J. 325, at 360. 
25
 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 5, at paras. 66-71. Relying on the distinction between  
s. 52 and s. 24(1) of the Charter drawn in R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 
(S.C.C.), the Court held that “where the validity of a law of general application is at stake, reason-
able accommodation is not an appropriate substitute for a proper s. 1 analysis based on the 
methodology of Oakes” (at para. 71) but left open the possibility of using notions of reasonable 
accommodation to assess the Charter-infringing government action or administrative practice. 
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down to two elements: (1) a more deferential posture towards the mini-
mal impairment test; and (2) a corollary admonition that more matters 
falling to section 1 should be decided under the third and final branch of 
the proportionality test — the overall balancing of the salutary effects of 
the offending legislation against the deleterious effects of the breach on 
the rights of the affected community.  
The Chief Justice leaves the rational connection test untouched, stat-
ing that “[t]he rational connection requirement is aimed at preventing 
limits being imposed on rights arbitrarily.”26 The question to be asked at 
the rational connection stage “is simply whether there is a rational link 
between the infringing measure and the government goal”.27 Yet a new 
sense of the approach to section 1 emerges when the majority addresses 
minimal impairment. The shift is not in the articulation of the test; 
McLachlin C.J.C. explains that the question to be asked at the minimal 
impairment stage is “whether there are less harmful means of achieving 
the legislative goal”.28 This is neither new nor contentious. The magic 
lies in the emphasis that the Court places on the words “achieving the 
legislative goal”. Chief Justice McLachlin carefully emphasizes that “the 
legislative goal, which has been found to be pressing and substantial, 
grounds the minimal impairment analysis”.29 Leaning heavily on this 
idea of the pressing and substantial goal anchoring the rational connec-
tion and, most importantly, the minimal impairment analysis, the Chief 
Justice offers the two key phrases for section 1 analysis post-Hutterian 
Brethren: “the minimum impairment test requires only that the govern-
ment choose the least drastic means of achieving its objective. Less 
drastic means which do not actually achieve the government’s objective 
are not considered at this stage.”30 
Perhaps the best way of thinking about this change in emphasis is as 
an admonition to hold the government’s pressing and substantial objec-
tive stable and fixed when conducting a minimal impairment analysis. 
Chief Justice McLachlin suggests that courts were too frequently relax-
ing the government’s objective in order to accommodate a less impairing 
alternative, thereby finding a limit unconstitutional. Although she “has-
ten[s] to add” that “the court need not be satisfied that the alternative 
would satisfy the objective to exactly the same extent or degree as the 
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 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 5, at para. 48.  
27
 Id., at para. 51. 
28
 Id., at para. 53. 
29
 Id., at para. 54. 
30
 Id., at para. 54 (emphasis in original). 
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impugned measure”,31 the clear message is that there is little flex in the 
joints at this stage of the analysis. A proposed alternative that is less im-
pairing but that also does not achieve the government’s objective (i.e., 
does not “give sufficient protection, in all the circumstances, to the gov-
ernment’s goal”)32 is not really a minimally impairing alternative. The 
question to be asked at the minimal impairment stage is “whether there is 
an alternative, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and 
substantial manner”.33  
If an applicant proposes a less impairing alternative that involves 
limiting or qualifying the government’s pressing and substantial objec-
tive, “[r]ather than reading down the government’s objective within the 
minimal impairment analysis, the court should acknowledge that no less 
drastic means are available and proceed to the final stage of Oakes.”34 In 
this admonition one sees the second element of the shift in approach to 
section 1 — the funnelling of more matters to be determined at the over-
all balancing stage. The Chief Justice cites Dickson C.J.C.’s description 
of the third and final step of the proportionality analysis, noting that de-
spite the importance that he gave to this branch of the test, “it has not 
often been used”.35 Indeed, when legislation has failed under section 1, it 
has most often foundered on the minimal impairment test.36 The majority 
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 Id., at para. 55 (emphasis in original). 
32
 Id., at para. 55. 
33
 Id., at para. 55 (emphasis added). “Where no alternative means are reasonably capable of 
satisfying the government’s objective, the real issue is whether the impact of the rights infringement 
is disproportionate to the likely benefits of the impugned law” (at para. 76). 
34
 Id., at para. 76. 
35
 Id., at para. 75. Hogg has gone so far as to state that, on his view of the logic of the Oakes 
test, this stage of the analysis “has no work to do, and can safely be ignored” (Peter W. Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf, 5th ed., vol. 2 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 38-
44). Chief Justice McLachlin explicitly takes up and rejects Hogg’s argument, at paras. 75-78, for 
reasons that I will explain below. See also Leon E. Trakman, William Cole-Hamilton & Sean 
Gatien, “R. v. Oakes 1986-1997: Back to the Drawing Board” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83, at 
103, in which the authors state that this branch of the Oakes test “plays a wholly vestigial role within 
section 1 decisionmaking”, reporting that, on a review of the s. 1 cases decided in the first 10 years 
after Oakes “[i]n every instance in which the minimal impairment test was passed, the proportional-
ity test was passed. In every instance that the minimal impairment test was failed, the proportionality 
test was either failed or not considered.” (emphasis in original) New Brunswick (Minister of Health 
and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) is one case in 
which the Court departed from this pattern, failing the infringement at the final, overall balancing 
stage. However, in this case the Court did not conduct a full proportionality analysis, skipping di-
rectly, rather, to the final branch. See also R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 
(S.C.C.), in which the overall balancing step played an important role in the majority’s analysis. 
36
 Hogg states that “[t]he requirement of least drastic means has turned out to be the heart 
and soul of s. 1 justification.” (Hogg,  id., at 38-36.) In a lecture delivered to the University of Mani-
toba, Faculty of Law, Rothstein J. observed that “[m]inimal impairment has consistently been the 
main battleground of section 1.” (“Section 1: Justifying Breaches of Charter Rights and Freedoms” 
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concludes that this is lamentable and requires correction. Chief Justice 
McLachlin explains that unlike the pressing and substantial objective 
analysis and the rational connection and minimal impairment stages, 
which are both centred on the legislative purpose, “[o]nly the fourth 
branch takes full account of the ‘severity of the deleterious effects of a 
measure on individuals or groups’.”37 Resolving matters at the final stage 
is to be preferred because this overall balancing “allows for a broader 
assessment of whether the benefits of the impugned law are worth the 
cost of the rights limitation”.38 The new approach to section 1 justifica-
tion thus involves holding stable the government’s objective when 
assessing minimal impairment and seeking to funnel issues more readily 
to the third and final “overall balancing” test. 
Justice LeBel offered the most thorough and vigorous objection to 
this approach to Oakes.39 In his estimation: 
For all practical purposes, the reasons of the Chief Justice treat the 
law’s objective as if it were unassailable once the courts engage in a 
proportionality analysis. No means that would not allow the objective 
to be realized to its fullest extent could be considered as a reasonable 
alternative.40 
Justice LeBel preferred a more “holistic” approach to the proportionality 
of offending legislation, arguing that the majority had drawn inappropri-
ately sharp lines between the various considerations under Oakes. “An 
alternative measure,” LeBel J. explained, “might be legitimate even if the 
objective could no longer be obtained in its complete integrity.”41 To 
properly assess the proportionality of a law might involve “looking for a 
solution that will reach a better balance, even if it demands a more  
                                                                                                             
(1990-2000) 27 Man. L.J. 171 at 178.) See Trakman, et al., id., at 100, in which the authors report 
that, in the decade following Oakes, 86 per cent of infringements that failed the Oakes analysis failed 
at the minimal impairment stage, whereas “every piece of legislation that survived scrutiny under the 
minimal impairment stage was held to have passed the Oakes test”. On the subsequent use and 
trends in s. 1, see generally Errol Mendes, “The Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. 
Judicial Deference in the Context of Section 1” (2005) 27 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47. 
37
 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 5, at para. 76. 
38
 Id., at para. 77. This statement reflects, of course, the Court’s important elaboration of 
this final stage of the analysis in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, 
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at 889 (S.C.C.): “there must be a proportionality between the deleterious effects 
of the measures which are responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the objec-
tive, and there must be a proportionality between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the 
measures.” (emphasis in original) 
39
 Justice Abella also penned dissenting reasons, which will be discussed below. 
40
 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 5, at para. 197. 
41
 Id., at para. 195. 
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restricted understanding of the scope and efficacy of the objectives of the 
measure”,42 an approach that LeBel J. viewed as more faithful to  
the Court’s recent jurisprudence.43 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE IRONY OF HUTTERIAN BRETHREN 
The shift in orientation signalled by the majority judgment is not 
confined to cases involving claims of religious freedom. Hutterian Breth-
ren is a case of substantial and general Charter significance. Yet in the 
course of making these subtle changes to the law of section 1, the major-
ity of the Court also made important statements about the law of freedom 
of religion. Although this rich judgment, and the dissenting reasons, pro-
vide much to meditate upon with respect to freedom of religion and 
religious equality, I wish to draw out what I view as the single most sig-
nificant theme from the Court’s reasons before identifying the irony 
nestled in the decision. 
When it arrived at the final “overall balancing” stage of the propor-
tionality analysis, the majority of the Court found that the deleterious 
impacts on the religious freedom of the community were outweighed by 
the salutary effects of the legislation. The government’s legislative goal, 
namely, “to maintain an effective driver’s licence scheme that minimizes 
the risk of fraud to citizens as a whole”,44 was weighty, whereas the dele-
terious effects of the legislation upon the Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony, “while not trivial, fall at the less serious end of the scale”.45 
The reasoning that leads to this conclusion that the mandatory pho-
tograph for driver’s licences had minimal deleterious effects on the 
Wilson Colony offers a clear window into an issue of the utmost conse-
quence: the law’s perspective on the true nature and constitutional value 
of religion. In an article written in 2007, I argued that religion is inevita-
bly processed through the values, assumptions and meaning-giving 
horizon of Canadian constitutionalism, meaning that religion never ap-
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pears to the law on its own cultural terms but, rather, is always rendered 
through the lens of the culture of the constitutional rule of law.46 Specifi-
cally, I argued that religion is ultimately understood as most significant 
to the law — and therefore attracts its protection — inasmuch as it ap-
pears as a matter of belief rather than action, private rather than public 
life, and, perhaps most crucially, as a matter of autonomy and choice.47 
When the Court turns to the analysis of the deleterious effects of this 
photo requirement on the Colony members’ section 2(a) interests, the 
centrality of choice to the law’s understanding of religion is plain.48  
Chief Justice McLachlin explains that assessing the effects of a limit 
on freedom of religion requires an assessment of the impact “in terms of 
Charter values, such as liberty, human dignity, equality, autonomy, and 
the enhancement of democracy”.49 In this, the Court sounds much as it 
did in Big M,50 wherein principles of equality and dignity were cast as 
key components of why religion enjoys constitutional protection. Despite 
reference to these other values, and equality in particular, in Hutterian 
Brethren, the Court cements the centrality of choice in the logic of the 
constitutional protection of religion. Having listed these Charter values, 
McLachlin C.J.C. explains that “[t]he most fundamental of these values, 
and the one relied on in this case, is liberty — the right of choice on mat-
ters of religion.”51 In assessing the gravity of the deleterious effects of a 
legal limit on section 2(a) interests “the question,” the majority holds, “is 
whether the limit leaves the adherent with a meaningful choice to follow 
his or her religious beliefs and practices.”52 Gauging the seriousness of a 
given limit on religious liberty turns on assessing whether an individual 
or community is left with this “meaningful choice” to follow their  
religion. A law whose purpose is to interfere with religious practice  
cannot be saved. So much is clear from Big M and remains true  
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post-Hutterian Brethren.53 When, however, a law passed for a legitimate 
public purpose has incidental effects on religion, everything turns on 
whether the religious adherent or community is left with a meaningful 
choice to follow their religious practices or beliefs. 
Why are the deleterious effects of the mandatory driver’s licence 
photograph “while not trivial … at the less serious end of the scale”?54 In 
the majority’s words, it is because “[o]n the record before us, it is impos-
sible to conclude that Colony members have been deprived of a 
meaningful choice to follow or not the edicts of their religion.”55 Chief 
Justice McLachlin seems to accept that the legislation may mean that, 
owing to their religious commitments, Colony members may have to 
choose not to drive; as such, they will suffer a financial cost, inconve-
nience and some disruption to their communal way of life. Yet these 
costs — “costs on the religious practitioner in terms of money, tradition 
or inconvenience”56 — were not so severe as to deny the community a 
meaningful choice to practise their religion. At the end of the day, the 
deleterious effects of the limit on section 2(a) are minimal because they 
“do not negate the choice that lies at the heart of freedom of religion”.57 
Hutterian Brethren confirms for us that, as far as Canadian constitution-
alism is concerned, freedom of religion is ultimately a matter of 
autonomy and choice. 
The focus of this paper, however, has been the structural reorienta-
tion and glosses on the section 1 analysis. And it is here that one finds a 
troubling, if interesting, irony in the judgment. Recall that the majority 
identified certain distinctive difficulties posed by the constitutional pro-
tection of religious freedom. The nature of religion is such that potential 
points of conflict with government programs are myriad, while the per-
spectival chasm between a given religious group or individual and a 
court can incline claims of religious freedom to an “all or nothing” struc-
ture and makes discerning the internal meaning or significance of a belief 
or practice to a tradition deeply difficult for a court.  
The irony of the Hutterian Brethren judgment is that pushing the 
analysis of the justifiability of limits on religious freedom to the final 
“overall balancing” stage of the Oakes test conditions and deepens the 
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very aspects of section 2(a) issues that the Court identifies as most prob-
lematic.  
Consider first the point that religious freedom and equality claims 
lend themselves to a kind of “all or nothing” high-stakes structure. 
Toughening up the minimal impairment test and herding section 2(a) 
breaches to the overall balancing seems to consolidate and aggravate this 
concern. As a structural matter, by the time one has arrived at the balanc-
ing stage of the Oakes test, the opportunity for the Court to invite and 
consider inventive resolutions that do not take an all-or-nothing form has 
disappeared. We are left to duelling impacts. At this point, a court may 
only conclude “you may do this” or “you may not”, having lost that in-
valuable result: “you might be able to do this, but you didn’t get it quite 
right.” Emphasis on the final step in the Oakes analysis encourages posi-
tional absolutism, particularly on the part of the government. Holding 
firm to a lofty objective, a government will find itself in the arguably 
enviable position of holding up its pressing, substantial and well-tailored 
public-oriented objective for comparison with the impacts of this law on 
an idiosyncratic and foreign belief. In this respect, viewed from the per-
spective of how constitutional analysis can condition cultural disputes, 
LeBel J.’s approach seems preferable.  
And what of the majority’s reservations regarding the difficulty of 
appreciating the true significance of a religious practice or belief? Analy-
sis of a limit under section 2(a) permitted courts to remain largely 
agnostic as to the internal meaning of a religious practice, tradition or 
precept. To conclude that a government had failed to give due regard to 
the existence of sincerely held religious beliefs or practice did not require 
that courts grapple with the internal meaning of that belief or practice, 
nor with possible competing claims within a community about the cen-
trality, marginality or symbolic valence of that religious observance. The 
flight from a more robust analysis internal to section 2(a) was, in part, an 
effort to remove the courts from such debates. Resolving matters under 
minimal impairment or a more flexibly applied proportionality analysis 
was arguably more consistent with this approach. Focusing matters 
squarely on the final stage of the proportionality analysis, by contrast, 
would seem to demand a meaningful reckoning with the actual signifi-
cance of the practice or belief with which the legislation interferes. 
Applicants will be encouraged to adduce evidence of the significance of 
the practice within the worldview of the individual or community as part 
of an answer to a government’s section 1 case. If the focus on the “over-
all balancing” is to be more than a realignment in favour of government 
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deference, judges will have to engage with this very difficult task of 
seeking to understand religious belief and practice from the perspective 
of the applicant, precisely the messy business that the courts seem to 
wish to avoid. 
But might not this substantive engagement with difference be a good 
thing? It all depends. The theoretical promise of deeper engagement must 
be evaluated in light of the practical realities and lived experiences of the 
adjudication of religion. In a situation in which substantive engagement 
is likely to prove reductionist with respect to one’s worldview and cul-
ture, one might well prefer to place one’s chips on a minimal impairment 
analysis. If the majority’s analysis in Hutterian Brethren is taken as ex-
emplary, this might be precisely the situation. I find myself here awfully 
close to arguing the merits of formalism — the formalism of minimal 
impairment; and, to be fair, faced with the prospect of being badly mis-
understood on substantive terms, one finds a certain virtue in escape to 
formalism. If, however, the move to overall balancing involves a serious 
and sustained engagement with the meaning of a religious practice to an 
individual or community, it may be that, although sharpening the cultural 
conflict, this shift to overall balancing improves the quality of the en-
gagement. It is here that the second back stream effect of changes in 
constitutional logic comes in — what this shift might imply for the de-
mands on and ethics of judgment, the final point to which I now turn.  
V. THE ADJUDICATIVE DEMANDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL  
PROTECTION OF RELIGION 
I asserted at the outset of this piece that constitutional rights and the 
manner in which constitutional reasoning is structured impacts not only 
on the shape that a cultural conflict will take before the courts, but also 
on the demands placed on judges called upon to adjudicate claims of re-
ligious freedom and equality. That is, the structure of constitutional 
reasoning has an effect on what emerge as the virtues of good judgment. 
I have alluded to this point in suggesting that the ultimate effect of mov-
ing matters to the third and final “overall balancing” component of the 
proportionality test within section 1 of the Charter will turn on the nature 
of judges’ engagement with the religious beliefs that they are called upon 
to assess in coming to a meaningful conclusion regarding the deleterious 
effects of a limit on religious freedom.  
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Taking, at this stage, the majority’s approach to the Oakes test as 
given, it is in respect of the need for thick engagement with the meaning 
of the religious practice at issue that the Hutterian Brethren decision  
arguably fell short. Although McLachlin C.J.C. allowed for collective 
considerations regarding the life of the community to inform the overall 
balancing test, one is left with a sense of a failure to grapple with what it 
means to the traditional life of this religious community to lose the self-
sufficiency that it enjoyed by having members that are able to drive.58 In 
its assessment of the deleterious effects of the limit on section 2(a), the 
majority lists a number of impacts that will fall at the lower end of the 
scale. Revealingly, impacts on “tradition” are listed alongside pecuniary 
impacts and matters of inconvenience.59 One need not be a Fiddler on the 
Roof aficionado to pause here and reflect upon the extent to which com-
munity, metaphysics, ritual and tradition are all deeply mutually 
imbricated. Ultimately, the majority characterizes the “cost” of this legis-
lation as, simply, “the cost of not being able to drive on the highway”.60  
The essence of Abella J.’s dissent is an objection to this apparent 
failure to grapple with the meaning of this legal predicament for the life 
of the Wilson Colony. Her judgment gestures towards the need in this 
case to take sensitive account of the meaning of a practice to the internal 
worldview and lived religion of a community if one is thinking seriously 
about the deleterious effects of a legislative limit on section 2(a). Justice 
Abella quotes from Hofer v. Hofer,61 in which Ritchie J. wrote that “the 
Hutterite religious faith and doctrine permeates the whole existence of 
the members of any Hutterite Colony”, and that “[t]o a Hutterian the 
whole life is the Church.”62 Just as Ritchie J. emphasized the importance 
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to these communities of “independence from the surrounding world”,63 
Abella J. took note of scholarly work that describes the “intensely self-
sufficient and deeply religious nature of the Hutterian Community”.64 At 
the core of her dissent is Abella J.’s conclusion that  
[t]o suggest, as the majority does, that the deleterious effects are minor 
because the Colony members could simply arrange for third party 
transportation, fails to appreciate the significance of their self-
sufficiency to the autonomous integrity of their religious community.65  
Result aside, the essential analytic difference between the majority and 
the dissent lies in the steps taken to wrestle with the internal understand-
ings of the affected community in assessing the deleterious effects of the 
limit. 
The shift in emphasis within the Oakes test effected in Hutterian 
Brethren does not, however, create the adjudicative demands that I am 
discussing here. The adjudicative challenge and ethical demands posed 
are intrinsic to the constitutional protection of religion. Simply put, the 
challenge is this: how is one to justly and fairly assess how to respond to 
beliefs and practices that come from a way of understanding and being in 
the world that is profoundly foreign to one’s own and, perhaps, to most 
with which one has come into contact? This question poses the essential 
struggle of religious freedom in a constitutional democracy. Yet to be 
fully accurate, the issue is not simply one of foreignness or unfamiliarity, 
though this captures a great deal of the difficulty. Ultimately, the chal-
lenge of adjudicating issues of religious difference often comes down to 
the need to engage with and attempt to sensitively examine beliefs and 
practices that one may instinctively view as absurd or even find to be 
tragically, disastrously mistaken. 
As I say, this is an adjudicative challenge endemic to the constitu-
tional protection of religion. It can never be wholly avoided. My 
argument here, however, is that shifting matters to the “overall balanc-
ing” phase of the Oakes analysis draws this challenge into particularly 
high relief. The point is a simple one: if claims of religious freedom will 
now more often turn on this balancing, the requirement to give meaning-
ful content to the “deleterious effects” of an impugned limit places the 
need to sensitively, thoroughly assess the internal significance of a prac-
tice or belief at the heart of the constitutional issue. To be clear, my point 
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is independent of any result in a particular case. One may well do a fine 
job of seeking to understand the impacts of a limit within the culture of 
the affected religion, and may reflect that understanding sympathetically 
back to the community and the public at large in reasons for judgment, 
yet nevertheless conclude that the impugned limit on section 2(a) is justi-
fied. The fairness and, with it, the legitimacy of the process turns, 
however, on this engagement and display.  
It is here that reference to last year’s other leading Supreme Court of 
Canada case raising matters of religious freedom is illuminating. I cite 
the case for a limited purpose and the decision demands its own full  
attention, so I provide here only a brief sketch of the issue. In C. (A.) v. 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services),66 a decision released 
less than a month after Hutterian Brethren, the Court was faced with a 
case involving an almost 15-year-old girl suffering from Crohn’s disease 
and in need of a life-saving blood transfusion. As a devout Jehovah’s 
Witness, she had, some months before, signed an advance medical direc-
tive expressing her wish not to receive blood transfusions. The Manitoba 
legislation presumed competence for those 16 years or older and pro-
vided that no medical procedure could be undertaken against the child’s 
wishes unless this presumption was rebutted. A.C. was assessed and all 
accepted that she was legally competent — she was, in essence, a mature 
minor. Yet as a child under the age of 16, the legislation vested the treat-
ment decision in a judge who was to balance a range of factors, 
ultimately issuing the order that comported with the best interests of the 
child. A.C. challenged the legislation on the basis that, as a competent 
minor who had expressed her wish to follow the dictates of her religion, 
the legislative scheme violated her section 2(a), section 7, and section 
15(1) rights.  
Inasmuch as they both concluded that A.C. was entitled to a greater 
role in the decision-making process than the courts below had afforded 
her, Abella J. (writing for the majority) and Binnie J. (in dissent) shared 
some common ground. Yet Abella J. declined to rule that the legislation 
was unconstitutional, instead flexing her statutory interpretation muscles 
to hold that the best interests of the child standard in the legislation  
required that a judge take account of the child’s wishes on a “sliding 
scale of decision-making autonomy”67 calibrated to the child’s maturity.68 
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Justice Abella held that this interpretation of the input required by the 
best interests test rendered the legislation constitutionally sound. Justice 
Binnie, by contrast, would have found that these provisions breached 
A.C.’s section 2(a) freedom (as well as her section 7 and section 15(1) 
rights), and could not be justified under section 1. In Binnie J.’s view, 
“input” into the decision, no matter how substantial, was simply not suf-
ficient. For him, Abella J.’s position  
ignores the heart of A.C.’s argument, which is that the individual 
autonomy vouchsafed by the Charter gives her the liberty to refuse the 
forced pumping of someone else’s blood into her veins regardless of 
what the judge thinks is in her best interest.69 
In coming to this conclusion, Binnie J.’s decision stands out as a re-
markable example of the ethical struggle that I suggest is demanded by 
the adjudication of religious freedom. The first words of his judgment 
are, simply, “[t]his is a disturbing case.”70 Elaborating, Binnie J. explains 
that A.C. “claims the right to make a choice that most of us would think 
is a serious mistake, namely to refuse a potentially lifesaving blood trans-
fusion. Her objection, of course, is based on her religious beliefs.”71 The 
tension in his judgment is palpable:  
The Charter is not just about the freedom to make what most members 
of society would regard as the wise and correct choice. If that were the 
case, the Charter would be superfluous. The Charter, A.C. argues, 
gives her the freedom — in this case religious freedom — to refuse 
forced medical treatment, even where her life or death hangs in the 
balance.72 
He goes on to acknowledge the foreignness — indeed, the apparent folly 
— for many of the particular religious beliefs that the Court is being 
asked to protect. Justice Binnie recognizes what I have argued is at the 
heart of the difficulty of cases involving religious difference: “Individu-
als who do not subscribe to the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses find it 
difficult to understand their objection to the potentially lifesaving effects 
of a blood transfusion.”73 Such is the chasm of cultural understanding 
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that the constitutional protection of religion asks that we venture across. “It 
is entirely understandable that judges, as in this case, would instinctively 
give priority to the sanctity of life”,74 Binnie J. concedes. “Religious 
convictions may change. Death is irreversible. Even where death is 
avoided, damage to internal organs caused by loss of blood may have 
serious and long lasting effects.”75 Yet he also draws to the surface a fa-
miliar value that may be of assistance in understanding the stakes of this 
decision that some would view as absurd: “strong as is society’s belief in 
the sanctity of life, it is equally fundamental that every competent indi-
vidual is entitled to autonomy to choose or not to choose medical 
treatment.”76  
Having laid bare the difficulty and stakes of the adjudicative task 
presented in the case, Binnie J. makes an obvious effort to go some dis-
tance to understanding what is involved in this decision from the 
perspective of the religious claimant. When he turns to his analysis of 
freedom of religion, he dedicates a paragraph to the following: 
Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that blood represents life and that respect 
for this gift from God requires the faithful to abstain from accepting 
blood to sustain life. They say that the Bible’s prohibition applies 
equally to eating, drinking and transfusing blood and is not lessened in 
times of emergency. They believe that observance of this principle is an 
element of their personal responsibility before God. In Malette, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that “[i]f [Mrs. Malette’s] refusal 
involves a risk of death, then according to her belief, her death would 
be necessary to ensure her spiritual life” (p. 429).77 
Having sought to understand and display the shape of the commitment 
from the perspective of the religious claimant, Binnie J. captures the  
essence of the adjudicative challenge when he addresses section 7. He 
notes that  
[t]he Court has … long preached the values of individual autonomy. In 
this case, we are called on to live up to the s. 7 promise in 
circumstances where we instinctively recoil from the choice made by 
A.C. because of our belief (religious or otherwise) in the sanctity of 
life.78  
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With all of this in mind, Binnie J. concludes at the now-all-important 
final stage of his section 1 analysis that “A.C. has demonstrated that the 
deleterious effects are dominant”.79 
Justice Binnie’s dissent in C. (A.) is an exemplary set of reasons in 
the Court’s developing jurisprudence on the constitutional protection of 
religious difference. He displays the difficulty of the demands that sec-
tion 2(a) places upon a judge; he overtly seeks to understand the meaning 
of the religious practice or belief to the adherent; he exemplifies in his 
reasons the judge’s need to stand faithful to constitutional values, but the 
concurrent obligation to genuinely entertain a constitutional margin for 
commitments and practices beyond the familiar or untroubling. One 
could have found the limit in C. (A.) to be justified and still have dis-
played all of these virtues. Had this been the result, it would have been 
with the stakes and commitments for all on full display. Having engaged 
in this hard work of cross-cultural engagement, the matter becomes far 
more difficult, far more fraught; however, even for those who would dis-
agree with the result, the difficult, contestable work of judgment in cases 
involving religious difference would have been manifest.  
Returning to the back stream effects of the structural realignment of 
Oakes that took place in Hutterian Brethren, the C. (A.) case shows the 
demands implicit in taking seriously the task of meaningful balancing of 
the salutary and deleterious effects of a breach of section 2(a). If the 
Court’s shift of emphasis to the deleterious effects stage of the analysis is 
to be anything other than a realignment of section 1 to provide greater 
deference to government objectives, this potential lies in judges using 
this legal analytic moment to recognize, accept and perform the enor-
mously challenging ethical tasks involved in adjudicating the interaction 
of religious difference and the law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Hutterian Brethren will have significance to Charter cases well be-
yond the realm of section 2(a). The Court’s desire to move cases beyond 
the minimal impairment stage and have more matters resolved in the 
context of the overall balancing of salutary and deleterious effects is a 
potentially significant change in the way in which courts will respond to 
constitutional disputes. Yet in addition to drawing this shift in section 1 
jurisprudence to the surface, this article has sought to demonstrate the 
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ways in which changes in constitutional reasoning are not solely about 
responses to constitutional struggles but actually influence the shape and 
understanding of these conflicts. In the context of the now active area of 
the adjudication of claims involving freedom of religion, the Court’s shift 
in approach to section 1 signalled by Hutterian Brethren presents the 
irony of amplifying those aspects of the section 2(a) right that the Court 
itself finds most challenging. Focusing on the balancing of deleterious 
and salutary effects conditions and cements the all-or-nothing structure 
that the Court laments as endemic to religious freedom claims while ar-
guably inviting the kinds of questions that the Court sought to avoid in 
its decision in Amselem.  
I have also argued that doctrinal changes to constitutional analysis 
have the potential to impose or emphasize different demands on those 
charged with adjudicating Charter claims. In the case of this shift in sec-
tion 1 analysis as it applies to claims involving religious difference, 
Hutterian Brethren and C. (A.) both point to the unique and uniquely 
challenging ethical burdens involved in adjudicating across cultural dif-
ference. Although not created by the realignment of Oakes in Hutterian 
Brethren, these adjudicative demands are drawn into high relief by the 
admonition to wrestle with the deleterious effects of limits on religious 
freedom. And perhaps one can identify a certain potential here. If taken 
seriously, this subtle change to proportionality review in Canadian con-
stitutional law could lead to a more transparent and honest — albeit more 
demanding and perhaps harrowing — mode of reasoning about religious 
difference within the Canadian constitutional rule of law that is more just 
and satisfying for religious claimants. 
Freedom of religion cases have emerged as rich sources for mining 
the assumptions, logic and trends in contemporary Canadian constitu-
tional law. Hutterian Brethren stands as yet another case, along with  
C. (A.), that reflects back to us much about the nature and struggles of 
our constitutional lives. 
